Inbound Tool-Schema Sanitizer
Cleans inbound MCP tool definitions before the model reads them, stripping embedded directives, running injection detectors, and holding schema drift against a SHA-256 baseline.
IntentGate is the protocol-aware MCP firewall for AI agents. It sits inline on the tool-call wire, between the model and the MCP servers it reaches, and enforces a fixed set of runtime controls on every request as it passes. These are those controls: eight capabilities, each with its own reference page, that together clean what the model reads, decide what the agent is allowed to do, bound how far it can go, cut it off on command, and leave signed evidence of every decision. Enforcement is deterministic, sub-millisecond deterministic checks and single-digit-ms policy, with no LLM in the block decision.
Every tool call takes the same ordered path. An inbound tool schema is sanitized, the call is resolved against declared intent, runtime limits bound how far it can go, upstream credentials are brokered on the outbound hop, and the request is either forwarded or denied, with signed evidence written either way. Deception and Session Rewind run alongside as the catch-and-recover layer.
The inbound tools/list definitions are cleaned before the model reads them: embedded directives stripped, injection detectors run, schema drift held against a SHA-256 baseline.
INBOUNDThe Semantic Action Resolver checks the requested call against the user's declared intent and refuses actions that fall outside it, so a hijacked agent cannot act beyond what was asked.
RESOLVEOutbound velocity, scope, and spend are bounded per session; a breaker trips when a threshold is crossed, stopping a runaway loop before it compounds.
BOUNDOn the upstream hop, the broker injects the credential the target server needs. The agent never holds or sees the secret, so a compromised agent has nothing to leak.
UPSTREAMA call inside policy is forwarded and allowed; a call outside it is denied, and a single Global Kill Switch can cut every in-flight call across the fleet at once.
DECIDEEvery decision, allow, deny, or cut, is packaged as tamper-evident, signed evidence, so what happened and why can be verified after the fact.
EVIDENCEEach control is enforced inline on the tool-call wire and documented on its own reference page. They compose: the inbound hygiene, the authorization decision, the runtime bounds, the emergency stop, the credential boundary, the deception and recovery layer, and the evidence trail.
Cleans inbound MCP tool definitions before the model reads them, stripping embedded directives, running injection detectors, and holding schema drift against a SHA-256 baseline.
The Semantic Action Resolver checks each requested tool call against the user's declared intent and refuses actions that fall outside it.
Bounds outbound velocity, scope, and spend per session, tripping a circuit breaker when a threshold is crossed to stop a runaway loop.
A single control that cuts every in-flight tool call across the fleet at once, halting all agents on command.
Injects the upstream credential a target server needs on the outbound hop, so the agent never holds or sees the secret.
Feeds a probing or hijacked agent controlled false data instead of failing open, containing it while the event is recorded.
Rolls a compromised session back to its last known-good state, undoing the effects of a detected bad path.
Packages every allow, deny, or cut decision as tamper-evident, signed evidence that can be verified after the fact.
The capabilities index sits inside the docs hub. These pages show how the controls are positioned, how they fit the architecture, and where they land in the product.