MCP firewall capability

Credential Brokering

Agents never hold upstream service credentials—the gateway brokers them. The agent presents a signed, scoped, short-lived capability token, and the gateway attaches the real service credential on the upstream call from its own secret store. The agent receives none of it.

Token in, real credential attached gateway-side

The agent’s claim is a scoped token. The real secret is added only at the boundary, on the outbound call, and never travels back to the agent.

Agent presents capability tokenSigned, scoped, short-lived. It says what the agent may do, not the secret that does it.
Gateway brokerVerifies the token, then attaches the real service credential from its own secret store on the upstream call.
Upstream serviceReceives an authorized call with a valid credential. The agent never saw it.

Where the secret actually lives

The real credential stays in a gateway-side secret store. The trust boundary between the agent and the tool server is exactly this swap.

AGENT → GATEWAY

Only a scoped token

The agent presents a signed capability token. Scope and expiry come from the verified payload, never from an untrusted header.

GATEWAY-SIDE SECRET STORE

K8s Secrets · Vault · AWS Secrets Manager

The real service credential is read from Kubernetes Secrets, HashiCorp Vault, or AWS Secrets Manager, held on the gateway side.

GATEWAY → TOOL SERVER

Credential attached upstream

The real credential is attached on the outbound call and forwarded to the tool server. It is never returned to the agent.

Honest limits

Brokering moves the secret to the boundary; it does not hand the agent a longer leash.

The agent receives no credential

A compromised or hijacked agent has a scoped token, not the upstream secret. It cannot exfiltrate a credential it never held.

Credentials stay upstream and gateway-side

The real credential lives in the gateway-side secret store and is used only on the upstream call. It does not flow back across the boundary.

Supported stores, honestly stated

Brokering reads from Kubernetes Secrets, HashiCorp Vault, and AWS Secrets Manager. We do not claim integrations beyond those.

It brokers secrets, it is not a secrets manager

Your secret store remains the source of truth. IntentGate attaches the credential at the boundary after the token verifies; it does not replace secrets management.